instead quickly and informally outline Dung's abstract argumentation frameworks, the core of 7 ASPIC, so as to make things easier for the reader without a mathematical background. For a detailed investigation of ASPIC see the technical report by H. Prakken, one of its authors. 8 So here is how Dung's abstract argumentation framework looks like:
An argument is a deduction whose premises are assumptions. To attack an argument, one attacks one or more of its assumptions. Thus an argument attacks an argument a if and only if attacks an assumption in the set of assumptions on which is based. b a b
An argument attacks an assumption if and only if the conclusion of the argument is the contrary of the assumption. (The same goes for group attacks, from a set of assumptions to a set of assumptions.)
In this context, an abstract argumentation framework (AF) is a pair . Informally, a set of arguments is admissible if and only if it contains only arguments B that have not been attacked or that have been defended when attacked. The semantics is defined by the notion of a preferred extension. We won't delve into the details here.
In Dung's model, the internal structure of arguments does not matter (it is really an abstract model). We need a framework where it does matter, for that is what counts in dispute resolution systems. Thus, Thomas Gordon's Carneades Argumentation System (CAS, for short) is the most appropriate framework as we will see shortly since it was designed for use in a procedural context. Readers interested on the rich history of CAS might want to check out the related papers. 77, 2 (1995) , 321357. 8 An abstract framework for argumentation with structured arguments, technical report, University of Utrecht, 2009. To lay down the CAS, basically we need only define statements, premises, arguments and argument graphs: Definition 1. (Statement) A statement (s) is a declarative sentence in a language. The complement of a statement s is denoted by s.
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Definition 2. (Premise) A premise (p) is a statement that falls on one of the following categories, and nothing more: an ordinary premise (so), an assumption (sa) or an exception (se). P is the set of premises. Argument graphs represent justifications, so that there is an acceptability relation between an argument graph and statements, with the whole framework aimed at modelling proofs. A statement, which may be used in several arguments, is thus acceptable if and only if the corresponding argument graph is a proof thereof. In this system, a dispute is about statements s, s, that is, about the final acceptability of s or of its complement (if s is accepted, then s is rejected and viceversa).
The advantage of argument graphs is that they can be easily visualized. In figure 1 below, we give an example of an argument graph for a fragment of a dispute about the applicability of the Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG). The main issue is s (CISG applies) or s (CISG does not apply):
The case we chose to illustrate the CAS is simple. According to Article 1(1) of the CISG, the convention applies to contracts of sale of goods between parties whose places of business are in different states. Article 1(1)(a) presents a further premise: both states need to be contracting states. That means both places of business (of each of the parties) must be in contracting states, a premise that depends on the fact that the state has already signed the convention. In our toy case, we have the following fictional facts, some of which are not directly depicted in the graph: 1) seller and buyer have places of business in different states (statement s1); 2) the state where the buyer has settled his business is England, and England is has not signed the convention (s2); 3) England has announced that it will sign the convention (s3); 4) from s2, we conclude that the state where the buyer has his place of business is not a contracting state (s4).
In the graph, arguments are denoted by circles, and statements by boxes. The use of arrows is selfevident: arguments go from premises (ordinary premises, assumptions or exceptions) to a conclusion. The "+" sign denotes a pro argument, and the sign denotes a con argument. So we establish the following acceptability relations: all statements above are accepted. The fact that s3 was put forth by the claimant (say) as a desperate con argument against s4 does not prevent us from accepting s4 (due to the internal structure of the dispute). The conclusion c, "CISG applies", is therefore negated: the pro argument s1 is clearly weaker than the con argument s4.
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Why so? Article 1(1)/1(1)(a) provides that the CISG itself applies to contracts of sale of good between parties whose places of business are in different states, except when one or both of these states are noncontracting states (or, alternatively, provided that both these states are contracting states). The x before the statement "CISG applies" denotes that the argument has been rejected, as expected, for if the premises of a con argument hold, then we have sufficient reasons for rejecting the conclusion. It is a very simple example which could otherwise be a very complicated one, with premises attacking assumptions attacking premises undermining conclusions and so on. Regardless of complexity, virtually any case could be represented isomorphically at the argumentation level using CAS. 10 9 For inferential purposes, in CAS arguments can be given degrees of strength by using real numbers in the interval [0, 1] . 10 For a detailed representation of a very complex and well known case in US litigation, see T. F. Gordon / The brief exposition and example above illustrate the use of argument graphs for representing the network of statements brought forth by the parties and the arbitrators as a way of consistently arguing about the case or justifying a decision. Although overlooked or ignored by the legal community, it is a very powerful tool (or tools: from simple visualization to sophisticated inference engines) both for solving practical cases and for investigating difficult theoretical issues in the fields of legal theory and dispute resolution systems.
Having said that, we now turn on to the problem of justification itself.
Two accounts on the search space of legal argumentation (inventio functions)
A search space or solution space in mathematics and computer science is the set of all possible solutions to a given problem. In chess, for instance, the search space is the set of all valid moves, given a game state. Each point in the corresponding search state represents a possible solution to the problem; usually one deals not with arbitrary solutions, but with feasible ones.
Analogically, we could think of the possible solutions to a dispute as the search space of argumentation. The example given above illustrates that. The case is: does the CISG apply? has his place of business is a noncontracting state; and so on (there are virtually infinite solutions!). But suppose the arguments s*1, s*2 and s*1 above are either the only selected solutions. Then {s*1, s*2, s*1} represents the effective search space of the case. Each of these statements, provided they are accepted, represent a point in the search space.
We call here inventio the process of systematically looking for (plausible) arguments pro and con a given conclusion, i. e., the solution to a case. It is not without reason. The term is exactly the one used by Ancient writers to refer to the core of the art of argumentation. It is one of the five canons of rhetoric (disposition, memoria, pronuntiatio, elocutio, inventio) Inventio, for short, is the obtaining of all interesting points in the search space of a given case.
Here is where classical rhetoric and theory of law meet. There are two traditions informally accounting for the constraints on the size of the search space of any given case. Although it is not exactly a good name in a precise historical context, we will call them the "civil law" (CiL) and the "common law" (CoL) accounts. Civil law, on the one hand, has it that the judge should be given only the facts of the case so as to be in a position to reach a decision; even though the parties will provide him or her with a plethora of arguments, the issue of legal justification is the judge's alone to solve. Da mihi facti, dabo tibi ius. On the other hand, common law has it that the judge is to restrict his inventio (the search for arguments) to the arguments expressly provided by the parties. He is not allowed to go beyond those arguments. Now we explore some formal properties in a semiformal way. It will be useful for understanding what is going on in the intended domain, even when some important elements are left undefined.
Inv is a function which takes as input a case and returns the set of all points in the search γ space S of . Let be a case. Then Since (1) S tends to be virtually infinite (i and j may be arbitrarily large) and not even recursively enumerable, and (2) our intended domain is not fitted for infinite outputs, we need a way of constraining its size. An adequate inventio function inv* is similar to an inventio function inv except that given a case it returns only adequate points, which must be finite in number. An γ adequate point set is simply the result of applying a selection function to the output search P ⊂ S space S of . The adequacy of a point is given by a system of justification imposing the nv(γ) i corresponding selection function. And that is where different accounts on adequate justifications may be of help.
In our semiformal framework, two extreme solutions come to mind, recalling what we said about CiL and CoL. The first is that the selection function should return only solutions P ⊂ S proposed by the parties in the pleadings stage (only arguments effectively brought forth); the second is that the selection function should return some or all of the solutions proposed by the parties and some new solutions in a possibly empty subset , so that the output is P ⊂ S R ⊂ S their union . Either way now the proper subset P of S is finite and welldefined and R P ⋃ ⊂ S can (given an entirely transparent, formal, framework) be searched over by an algorithm with the proper questions, such as "give me all the solutions using at least one Argument from Expert
Witness". S cannot be searched because it is not even recursively enumerable, even given a normative system, principles, goals, cases, and all the facts that can be seen as established.
The problem is that R has the same practical disadvantage of S itself: it is possibly infinite. While we have a source for P, the pleading stage with its dialectical constraints, the possible elements of R are virtually the same as those of S. Recall Solomon's veterotestamentary decision in 1
Kings 3:1628: given solutions by mother_1 and mother_2 about who was the mother of the living child (both elements of P in our artificial framework) he rejected both arguments and decided to divide the child in two (therefore, in our framework, an element of R entirely outside the search space of S). Of course it was only an strategic solution. Such Solomonic solutions are not uncommon in arbitrations and have even been given a name: "splitting the baby".
We introduce the notion of argumentative agents for representing the parties and the form someone a proposed a solution s in the pleadings game, provided that it was done in a valid way, formalized as prop (a,s) . Since the pleadings game is always implicit, we omit it from the 13 formalization.
The intended function inv* (the first case above) is relatively trivial and can be defined as follows:
(Definition of inv*) Let be a case and for
, . Let and be the only argumentative agents in the pleadings game.
, and for every , either or .
Since the second extreme case possibly includes R, we only need a function inv** that combines inv and inv*. That can be easily done, but we will explore a more interesting intermediate case, that seems to reflect empirical data on the justification of awards in arbitration. First we have to understand what are the informal constraints on inventio in arbitration proceedings.
Theoretical and empirical note on inventio and justification in arbitration
This paper is based on two common sense assumptions: (a) all international arbitration systems of note require that at least final decisions be justified by precisely indicating the reasons upon which they are based; (b) implicitly or otherwise, the majority of systems also provide for that Ideally, a good decision is not one for which there are some good reasons for it, but one for which one could say that "on balance, all reasons considered, the decision represents the best resolution of the available reasons." Of course, we understand the already mentioned problem 16 raised by the computer scientist Thomas F. Gordon: it is impossible to consider all reasons, since the set of possible arguments is not even recursively enumerable. That is why we think 17 the state of the otherwise dynamic set of arguments presented by the parties during the pleadings stage is the mandatory starting point for the effective argumentation space of justification in arbitration. Perhaps only argumentation theory and CMA could convey this idea.
The goal of an award being not only to present a good solution, but also and perhaps more importantly to persuade the parties that it is a good solution, it is clear that the investigation on the bounds of inventio is of utmost importance. be bound both by the premises and the conclusion that immediately supports the claim as presented by the parties to the dispute; only by the premises; only by the conclusion; or by neither of them.
Before we proceed with the investigation in the next section, we briefly summarize theoretical and empirical findings related to the issue above.
On the one hand, the theoretical status of this question is dubious. Commentators rarely address the issue with the required precision, perhaps due to their focus on nonformal approaches. We do not think that this superficiality is wise; that does not even favor pragmatism, for superficiality leave all the practical problems entirely open. Likewise, philosophers of law either address the problem of the search space of arguments in arbitration only indirectly, for local law codes in the CiL tradition and CoL provide different and mutually inconsistent answers, or they simply ignore it. The most important problem, in our view, can be reduced to a single 19 twofold question: is it permitted for arbitrators to fabricate one or more arguments that were not even mentioned, or implied, by the parties to the dispute, and if so, do these arguments include only conclusions or also premises?
On the other hand, in practice, approaches vary greatly. A certain empirical analysis in the field of jurimetrics could, notwithstanding, illuminate the issue. It was conducted by Ole Kristian
Fauchald of the University of Oslo; a detailed investigation of motivation (among other problems) using a corpus of nearly 100 arbitration awards issued by ad hoc tribunals of the International
Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) revealed that they "made an effort to address all arguments raised by the parties to the dispute", but that "this does not prevent [ed] tribunals from exercising judicial restraint by avoiding dealing with issues that can be left aside as a consequence of conclusions on other issues"; particularly, "tribunals responded explicitly 18 This kind of imprecise restatement of formal or semiformal propositions is dangerous but can be used to facilitate understanding of the main issue. their arguments, and the tribunal, noting the agreement, simply adopted the consensual interpretation, without presenting its own arguments; (5) on one occasion, the tribunal 25 considered the argument of the parties, adopted the conclusion of the claimant but, without
properly rejecting his premises, adopted a different premise; (6) on the same occasion, the 26 tribunal adopted the premise presented by the defendant, which was the same as the one presented by the claimant, but rejected the conclusion of the former, concurring with the (different) conclusion of the latter.
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The findings allow us to conclude, further, on plausible theoretical, legal and empirical grounds that unless the case deals with a public issue, the tribunal is defeasibly allowed to vary on the sets of grounds X, Y presented by the parties, but not on the set of claims raised by the parties x, y. As regards public issues, it seems reasonable that they are allowed to be raised by the arbitrators; but in that case it should be decided only after consultation with the parties, since one of the main goals of the award is to present a rhetorically correct solution to the case. 
A possible formalization of the constraints. Conclusion
Based on our conclusions above, it seems that the best way of attacking the issue of the constraints on the search space of argumentation in arbitration, aiming at proposing a 'persuasiondriven', rhetorically correct model of award drafting, is to follow an algorithmic approach.
The parties to a dispute, at the time of the decision, have already presented their cases. All the arguments were brought forth, and the arbitrator is now bound both by the primary duty to decide (non liquet not being a possible way out) and by the duty to decide within the limits drawn by the issues and arguments presented. The duty is one of invention. Recall the CAS sketched above and the functions inv*, inv defined. Given the result of the inventio already carried forth, in a dialectical way, by the parties, the arbitrator should then apply his own inventio to the result; that should bring us back to the problem sketched in the last section, which has four basic possible solutions: should his inventio be bound both by the premises and the conclusion presented by the parties to the dispute, only by the premises, only by the conclusion, or by neither of them?
Based on the conclusions established in last section, he is bound only by the conclusions x or y, which may be identical, but not by the sets of grounds X, Y. For each item n of the dispositive section, he may use a new set of grounds Z to back his decision in favor of conclusion x or conclusion y, even when faced with a public issue (that should be added to the premises already in Z). But what is the use of X and Y? Utterly ignoring them would be a violation of the purpose of basic due process principles such as that of contradiction (audiatur et altera pars). It would be absurd to hear both parties if their arguments should in be ignored after all.
That have been said, we are ready to present our model. Let CAS be the underlying argumentation system, with working definitions. Let be a case with dispositive items γ and for , . Let and
be the only argumentative agents in the pleadings game. Let be a solution s backed by β Γ k ≻ s k a set of reasons. The set of partysolutions (or search space of argumentation as defined by the parties) is then:
The inventio function representing the selective activity of an arbitrator given the search space of argumentation P provided by the parties can be thus characterized as follows:
inventio(P) = for each dispositive item n in the decision, nondeterministically either (a)
such that for each , and This second approach is likely to simplify the formal apparatus, facilitating computational implementations of argumentation models, but may be seen as unrealistic in the light of the reallife functioning of the majority of humancentered systems.
We note most importantly that Online Dispute Resolution (ODR) could favor this second approach (using the strongly constrained inventio* to obtain the search space of argumentation), since the enlarging of the search space is computationally unfeasible, in addition to foster total undecidability (solutions are not recursively enumerable). It is also impossible to automatically generate new premises, unless a new apparatus is introduced for that purpose. Nonetheless, it is doubtful that such an ODR system would be unfair. Constraints on the search space of 28 argumentation can be justified by showing that foreseeability is to be favored over traditional material justice. In that way it is possible to transcend the CiL and CoL traditions and the mere pragmatics of award justification in arbitration.
Moreover, if the parties agree beforehand that only the justifications provided by them are to be taken into consideration by the arbitrator, it does not appear that the resulting decision system should be a priori regarded as unfair. It should also be noted that foreseeability and effectiveness are also criteria for (procedural) justice. DALT 2007 , Honolulu, HI, USA, May 14, 2007 , Springer, 2008 
